By Jörg Diehl, Mohannad al-Najjar and Christoph Reuter
Der Spiegel
June 21, 2022
https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/syrian-drug-smuggling-the-assad-regime-would-not-survive-loss-of-captagon-revenues-a-b4302356-e562-4088-95a1-45d557a3952a-amp
July 30, 2022
"The Assad Regime Would Not Survive Loss of Captagon Revenues"
The regime of Bashar Assad is apparently deeply involved in the trade of synthetic drugs. German investigators have now found proof that Syria's dictator is apparently funding his rule with drug money.
By Jörg Diehl, Mohannad al-Najjar and Christoph Reuter
Der Spiegel
June 21, 2022
https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/syrian-drug-smuggling-the-assad-regime-would-not-survive-loss-of-captagon-revenues-a-b4302356-e562-4088-95a1-45d557a3952a-amp
By Jörg Diehl, Mohannad al-Najjar and Christoph Reuter
Der Spiegel
June 21, 2022
https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/syrian-drug-smuggling-the-assad-regime-would-not-survive-loss-of-captagon-revenues-a-b4302356-e562-4088-95a1-45d557a3952a-amp
We cannot ignore Syria's emergence as a narco-state
By Charles Lister
Middle East Institute
April 29, 2022
Middle East Institute
April 29, 2022
Syria's emerging drug empire is not going away soon
Many analysts believe that the profits generated by drug manufacturing and export have become an important revenue stream for the cash-strapped Syrian government.
By Dr. Haid Haid
The Arab Weekly
February 7, 2022
The battle against captagon
The 'poor man’s cocaine' is now rife across the Middle East, heralding an era of violent, state-sponsored drug-trafficking, says Vanda Felbab-Brown
By Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown
Chatham House
May 27, 2022
A dirty business': how one drug is turning Syria into a narco-state
Manufacture of Captagon is a growth industry so big it is starting to rival GDP of flatlining economy
By Martin Chulov
The Guardian
May 7, 2021
The Syrian Economy at War: Captagon, Hashish, and the Syrian Narco-State
Center for Operational Analysis and Research
April 27, 2021
April 27, 2021
Four killed in attempt to smuggle drugs from Syria, Jordan's armed forces say
By Maher Chmaytelli, Yasmin Hussein and Toby Chopra
Reuters
May 22, 2022
Reuters
May 22, 2022
Captagon Act H.R.6265
To require a strategy by the United States Government to disrupt and dismantle the Captagon trade and narcotics networks of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
U.S. Congress
December 14, 2021
July 12, 2022
Iran Is Trying to Convert Syria to Shiism
Ten years after entering Syria’s civil war, Tehran is using religion to make its influence there permanent.
By Anchal Vohra
Foreign Policy
March 15, 2021
Foreign Policy
March 15, 2021
Iran repopulates Syria with Shia Muslims to help tighten regime's control
New communities are settling in areas where Sunnis have fled or been forced out as Tehran seeks an arc of control stretching from its borders to Israel
By Martin Chulov
The Guardian
January 14, 2017
The Guardian
January 14, 2017
Iran's Long Game in Syria
By Oula A. Alrifai, Nakissa Jahanbani and Mehdi Khalaji
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
March 29, 2021
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
March 29, 2021
Iranian Strategic Goals of converting Syrian Euphrates Area into Shia
By Strategic Studies Unit
MENA Reseach and Study Center
September 15, 2019
MENA Reseach and Study Center
September 15, 2019
Iran Is Building a New Source of Shia Influence Inside Syria
By Lina Sinjab
Chatham House
November 2017
Chatham House
November 2017
https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/iran-is-building-a-new-source-of-shia-influence-inside-syria
June 15, 2022
Human rights lawyers attempt to bring Syria war crimes cases to ICC
Attempt to target Iranian and Syrian officials includes evidence from civilians forced to flee to Jordan
By Patrick Wintour
The Guardian
February 16, 2022
European Parliament resolution on the Syrian conflict - 10 years after the uprising
The European Parliament
Texts adopted
March 11, 2021
Texts adopted
March 11, 2021
Increase in actions against impunity for war crimes by Syrian regime
EU Day Against Impunity focuses on Syria ten years after start of conflict
European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation
May 21, 2021
May 21, 2021
U.S. Department of State Reports 2011-2021
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
Syria
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
Syria
2021
2020
2019
2018
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
He smuggled war crimes evidence and begged the US for help. Now Congress is finally acting and set to sanction Syria.
By Mallory Simon and Kate Bolduan
CNN
December 18, 2019
CNN
December 18, 2019
Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019
22 USC 8791: Imposition of sanctions with respect to certain persons who are responsible for or complicit in human rights abuses committed against citizens of Syria or their family members
May 14, 2022
Iranian strategy in Syria
By Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer
https://www.understandingwar.org/report/iranian-strategy-syria
The Institute for the Study of War
The Critical Threats Project of the American Enterprise Institute
May 2013https://www.understandingwar.org/report/iranian-strategy-syria
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_NVmQSf-arLVCqbuXgB4Gi-e4RxcQ3gV/view?usp=sharing
Executive summary
The Islamic Republic of Iran has conducted an extensive, expensive, and integrated effort to keep President Bashar al-Assad in power as long as possible while setting conditions to retain its ability to use Syrian territory and assets to pursue its regional interests should Assad fall.
The Iranian security and intelligence services are advising and assisting the Syrian military in order to preserve Bashar al-Assad's hold on power. These efforts have evolved into an expeditionary training mission using Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces, Quds Force, intelligence services, and law enforcement forces. The deployment of IRGC Ground Forces to conflict abroad is a notable expansion of Iran's willingness and ability to project military force beyond its borders.
Iran has been providing essential military supplies to Assad, primarily by air. Opposition gains in Syria have interdicted many ground resupply routes between Baghdad and Damascus, and the relative paucity of Iranian port-visits in Syria suggests that Iran's sea-lanes to Syria are more symbolic than practical. The air line of communication between Iran and Syria is thus a key vulnerability for Iranian strategy in Syria. Iran would not be able to maintain its current level of support to Assad if this air route were interdicted through a no-fly zone or rebel capture of Syrian airfields.
Iran is also assisting pro-government shabiha militias, partly to hedge against Assad's fall or the contraction of the regime into Damascus and a coastal Alawite enclave. These militias will become even more dependent on Tehran in such a scenario, allowing Iran to maintain some ability to operate in and project force from Syria.
Lebanese Hezbollah began to take on a more direct combat role in Syria as the Assad regime began losing control over Syrian territory in 2012. Hezbollah has supported Assad with a robust, well-trained force whose involvement in the conflict aligns with Iranian strategic interests as Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah acknowledged on April 30 in Tehran. Hezbollah's commitment is not without limitations, however, because Nasrallah must carefully calibrate his support to Assad with his domestic responsibilities in order to avoid alienating his core constituency in Lebanon.
Iraqi Shi'a militants are also fighting in Syria in support of Assad. Their presence became overt in 2012 with the formation of the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade, a pro-government militia that is a conglomerate of Syrian and foreign Shi‘a fighters, including members of Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraq-based Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata’ib Hezbollah. Like other paramilitary forces operating in Syria, these militants escalated their involvement as the conflict descended into civil war. The open participation of Iraqi Shi'a militants in Syria is an alarming indicator of the expansion of sectarian conflict throughout the region.
The Syrian conflict has already constrained Iran's influence in the Levant, and the fall of the Assad regime would further reduce Tehran’s ability to project power. Iran's hedging strategy aims to ensure, however, that it can continue to pursue its vital interests if and when the regime collapses, using parts of Syria as a base as long as the Syrian opposition fails to establish full control over all of Syrian territory.
Executive summary
The Islamic Republic of Iran has conducted an extensive, expensive, and integrated effort to keep President Bashar al-Assad in power as long as possible while setting conditions to retain its ability to use Syrian territory and assets to pursue its regional interests should Assad fall.
The Iranian security and intelligence services are advising and assisting the Syrian military in order to preserve Bashar al-Assad's hold on power. These efforts have evolved into an expeditionary training mission using Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces, Quds Force, intelligence services, and law enforcement forces. The deployment of IRGC Ground Forces to conflict abroad is a notable expansion of Iran's willingness and ability to project military force beyond its borders.
Iran has been providing essential military supplies to Assad, primarily by air. Opposition gains in Syria have interdicted many ground resupply routes between Baghdad and Damascus, and the relative paucity of Iranian port-visits in Syria suggests that Iran's sea-lanes to Syria are more symbolic than practical. The air line of communication between Iran and Syria is thus a key vulnerability for Iranian strategy in Syria. Iran would not be able to maintain its current level of support to Assad if this air route were interdicted through a no-fly zone or rebel capture of Syrian airfields.
Iran is also assisting pro-government shabiha militias, partly to hedge against Assad's fall or the contraction of the regime into Damascus and a coastal Alawite enclave. These militias will become even more dependent on Tehran in such a scenario, allowing Iran to maintain some ability to operate in and project force from Syria.
Lebanese Hezbollah began to take on a more direct combat role in Syria as the Assad regime began losing control over Syrian territory in 2012. Hezbollah has supported Assad with a robust, well-trained force whose involvement in the conflict aligns with Iranian strategic interests as Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah acknowledged on April 30 in Tehran. Hezbollah's commitment is not without limitations, however, because Nasrallah must carefully calibrate his support to Assad with his domestic responsibilities in order to avoid alienating his core constituency in Lebanon.
Iraqi Shi'a militants are also fighting in Syria in support of Assad. Their presence became overt in 2012 with the formation of the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade, a pro-government militia that is a conglomerate of Syrian and foreign Shi‘a fighters, including members of Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraq-based Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata’ib Hezbollah. Like other paramilitary forces operating in Syria, these militants escalated their involvement as the conflict descended into civil war. The open participation of Iraqi Shi'a militants in Syria is an alarming indicator of the expansion of sectarian conflict throughout the region.
The Syrian conflict has already constrained Iran's influence in the Levant, and the fall of the Assad regime would further reduce Tehran’s ability to project power. Iran's hedging strategy aims to ensure, however, that it can continue to pursue its vital interests if and when the regime collapses, using parts of Syria as a base as long as the Syrian opposition fails to establish full control over all of Syrian territory.
Factbox: Iranian influence and presence in Syria
By Navvar Saban
Atlantic Council
Atlantic Council
MENASource
November 2020
November 2020
Summary
Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Iran has found different approaches to increase its military and security influence in Syria. The first approach was by directly working with foreign militias and recruiting local militias. The second approach was created from the core of the first one. Its main objective was to integrate local Iranian militias into Bashar al-Assad's military and its security branches to give them a legal standing in Syria and an umbrella of protection from possible Israeli or US air strikes.
However, with a decrease in military operations in Syria, Iran began searching for new ways to enhance its control and influence in different Syrian provinces, especially after its success in infiltrating the regime’s army and security apparatus.
Since the beginning of 2017, Iran has turned some of its focus on infiltrating Syrian society and strengthening its relations with Syrian businessmen. This factbox presents a limited summary of Iran's military and security power in Syria, revealing the extent of its sway over Syrian society and its economy.
Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Iran has found different approaches to increase its military and security influence in Syria. The first approach was by directly working with foreign militias and recruiting local militias. The second approach was created from the core of the first one. Its main objective was to integrate local Iranian militias into Bashar al-Assad's military and its security branches to give them a legal standing in Syria and an umbrella of protection from possible Israeli or US air strikes.
However, with a decrease in military operations in Syria, Iran began searching for new ways to enhance its control and influence in different Syrian provinces, especially after its success in infiltrating the regime’s army and security apparatus.
Since the beginning of 2017, Iran has turned some of its focus on infiltrating Syrian society and strengthening its relations with Syrian businessmen. This factbox presents a limited summary of Iran's military and security power in Syria, revealing the extent of its sway over Syrian society and its economy.
The Syrian Civil War
By Robert S. Ford
Middle East Institute
April 2019
Middle East Institute
April 2019
Extract
IRAN
Assad's key partner is not Russia but rather Iran, which has provided most of the manpower that has enabled Assad to keep fighting. In 2013 when Assad’s hold on power was weakening, Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah's critical intervention turned the tide in Homs Province. In 2014-15 Iran's al-Quds Force, the foreign and clandestine wing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), led by General Qassem Soleimani, mobilized fighters from Iraqi Shi'a militant groups such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ib Hezbollah to fight in Syria. It also organized Afghans and Pakistanis into the Afghan Fatemiyoun and Pakistani Zainebiyoun brigades, which it sent to Syria. These groups provided decisive manpower in many of the battles the Syrian government won between 2015 and 2018. Outside analysts estimated that Iran provided as many as 80,000 foreign Shi'a fighters to support Assad. These Iranian-backed foreign Shi'a militias, under IRGC command, are deeply embedded into the broader Syrian security force order of battle and command network.
Iran's principle goal is to ensure the survival of the Assad government, which in turn provides strategic depth to Lebanese Hezbollah and the Iranian-backed "resistance front" against Israel. (This front seeks to deter Israel from carrying out a direct attack against Iran, and the confrontation with Israel gives Iran and its allies at least a nominal claim to regional leadership.) The Iranian government has repeatedly asserted that forces under its command will remain in Syria, while denouncing the presence of American forces in eastern Syria as well as American support for the People's Protection Units (YPG) militia and local Arab fighters. Iran's material losses have not been great, as Iraqi, Lebanese, Afghan, and Pakistani fighters bore the brunt of losses under Iranian command. Iran's difficult economic circumstances, notably oil export revenue cuts, are starting to hinder its activities in Syria, but the Iranian government is firmly committed to a long-term presence there.
Iran's Unwavering Support to Assad's Syria
By Karim Sadjadpour
Combatting Terrorism Center
August 2013
Combatting Terrorism Center
August 2013
Nowhere to Hide: The Logic of Chemical Weapons Use in Syria
By Tobias Schneider and Theresa Lütkefend
The Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi)
February 2019
https://www.gppi.net/2019/02/17/the-logic-of-chemical-weapons-use-in-syria
The Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi)
February 2019
https://www.gppi.net/2019/02/17/the-logic-of-chemical-weapons-use-in-syria
https://drive.google.com/file/d/18EQ4l8hr-c582lRdOLS4Y3sGWjBuh-OP/view?usp=sharing
Summary
Our research found that there have been at least 336 chemical weapons attacks over the course of the Syrian civil war – significantly more than has commonly been known. Around 98 percent of these attacks can be attributed to the Assad regime, with the Islamic State group responsible for the rest. Approximately 90 percent of all confirmed attacks occurred after the infamous "red line" incident of August 2013.
The Syrian military's chemical warfare campaign is closely intertwined – logistically, operationally and strategically – with its campaign of conventional warfare. The designs of the Assad regime's improvised chlorine munitions, which have accounted for at least 89 percent of all chemical attacks throughout the war, are clearly derived from conventional "barrel" or "lob" bombs. Both are employed by the same Syrian military formations via the same delivery systems.
It is clear that the Syrian military has consistently prioritized striking population centers over rebel positions on the frontlines, even in the face of defeat on the ground. Indeed, the Syrian regime's persistent and widespread use of chemical weapons is best understood as part of its overall war strategy of collective punishment of populations in opposition-held areas. Chemical weapons are an integral component of its arsenal of indiscriminate violence, alongside sieges and high-explosive weapons such as "barrel bombs."
We show that the Assad regime did not merely "get away" with its use of these banned weapons, but succeeded in using them for strategic ends. More than two-thirds of Syria's population are internally or externally displaced, and opposition-held communities have been buckling and surrendering under the cumulative weight – and eventually the mere threat – of violence, including the use of chemical weapons.
Putting a stop to the Syrian regime's strategy of chemical weapons use will require halting its overall machinery of indiscriminate violence. In order to effectively disrupt the Syrian chemical weapons complex and deter their future use in Syria and other conflicts, the United States and the wider international community should directly target the military formations that would be responsible for any future attacks. The Syrian helicopter fleet, which has played a critical role in the delivery of conventional and chemical barrel bombs, should be a primary target.
Summary
Our research found that there have been at least 336 chemical weapons attacks over the course of the Syrian civil war – significantly more than has commonly been known. Around 98 percent of these attacks can be attributed to the Assad regime, with the Islamic State group responsible for the rest. Approximately 90 percent of all confirmed attacks occurred after the infamous "red line" incident of August 2013.
The Syrian military's chemical warfare campaign is closely intertwined – logistically, operationally and strategically – with its campaign of conventional warfare. The designs of the Assad regime's improvised chlorine munitions, which have accounted for at least 89 percent of all chemical attacks throughout the war, are clearly derived from conventional "barrel" or "lob" bombs. Both are employed by the same Syrian military formations via the same delivery systems.
It is clear that the Syrian military has consistently prioritized striking population centers over rebel positions on the frontlines, even in the face of defeat on the ground. Indeed, the Syrian regime's persistent and widespread use of chemical weapons is best understood as part of its overall war strategy of collective punishment of populations in opposition-held areas. Chemical weapons are an integral component of its arsenal of indiscriminate violence, alongside sieges and high-explosive weapons such as "barrel bombs."
We show that the Assad regime did not merely "get away" with its use of these banned weapons, but succeeded in using them for strategic ends. More than two-thirds of Syria's population are internally or externally displaced, and opposition-held communities have been buckling and surrendering under the cumulative weight – and eventually the mere threat – of violence, including the use of chemical weapons.
Putting a stop to the Syrian regime's strategy of chemical weapons use will require halting its overall machinery of indiscriminate violence. In order to effectively disrupt the Syrian chemical weapons complex and deter their future use in Syria and other conflicts, the United States and the wider international community should directly target the military formations that would be responsible for any future attacks. The Syrian helicopter fleet, which has played a critical role in the delivery of conventional and chemical barrel bombs, should be a primary target.
The Syrian civil war: Timeline and statistics
By Philip Loft, Meg Harding, and Georgina Sturge
Research Briefing Number 9381
UK Parliament
House of Commons Library
November 2021
Extract
The Syrian civil war in numbers
Casualties in Syria
In September 2021, the UN published updated estimates on the number of civilians killed in Syria. It compiled a list of 350,209 individuals killed between March 2011 and March 2021. 1 in 13 were women, and 1 in 13 were children. This, the UN said, was the "minimum verifiable number" and "certainly an undercount."
In June 2021, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) said the total number of those killed from March 2011 to June 2021 could be as high as 606,000, including 495,000 documented by the organisation. The total includes civilians, rebel, government and terrorist fighters, and others.
The SOHR also estimated 2.1 million civilians have been injured or made permanently disabled because of the conflict. In 2016, the World Health Organization had said 1.5 million people had been injured since the crisis began.
Missing people
The exact number of Syrians who have forcibly disappeared, been detained, abducted, or gone missing is unknown.
In 2019, the UN said that reports suggested that more than 100,000 had gone missing since the start of the conflict, "largely, but not only, because of the Syrian government."
In 2021, a report to the UN said the whereabouts of "tens of thousands" of those detained remained unknown.
Impact on children
In addition to the estimated 27,126 children killed in the ten years from March 2011,36 according to UN figures:
• From 2011 to 2020 more than 5,700 children were recruited into the fighting.
• In March 2021, refugee children numbered 2.5 million.
• In March 2021, 3.5 million children were out of school, including 40% of girls. Enrolment prior to the conflict was 97%.
Refugees and displaced people
The total pre-war population of Syria was around 21 million. More than half this population is now displaced from their homes, either internally within Syria or as refugees abroad.
Internally displaced people (IDP)
As of December 2020, there were around 6.7 million internally displaced people living in Syria. 5.8 million have been displaced for more than three years. Only 11% of IDP households intended to return to their area of origin in 2021.
As of August 2020, the largest numbers of IDPs are found in opposition controlled Idlib (1.8 million) and regime-controlled Aleppo (1.2 million). The city of Damascus and rural Damascus governorates, held by the regime, had 1.9 million IDPs.
IDPs represent half of all people in humanitarian need in Syria.
Syrian refugees
Refugees first started leaving Syria in large numbers in 2012, with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees recording around 730,000 Syrian refugees in that year. This number grew rapidly to around 5.1 million refugees and asylum seekers in 2015 and has continued to grow in every year since.
In 2021, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) recorded 6.8 million Syrian refugees and asylum seekers globally.
Two thirds of Syrian refugees (4.5 million individuals) live in Turkey and Jordan, with most of those (54% or 3.7 million individuals) residing in Turkey. As of 2021, Jordan was hosting the third largest population of Syrian refugees (670,000), followed by Germany (620,000), and Iraq (250,000).
The UNHCR estimates that 70% of Syrian refugees live in poverty. This rises to 80% in Jordan prior to the Covid-19 pandemic (under the poverty line of US$ 3/day) and 89% of those in Lebanon (who live on less than half the Lebanese minimum wage).
Humanitarian needs of the population
The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports there were 13.4 million in need of humanitarian assistance in 2021.
This included 2.7 million people in Aleppo and 2.2 million in Idlib. 75% are women and children. 2.3 million of those aged over 12 have a disability.
In 2021, around 12.4 million were food insecure, meaning they are compromising on food quality or variety, or reducing the quantity they consume. This was a 56% rise from the 7.9 million food insecure people in 2019. This includes 1.3 million who are severely food insecure, meaning they had no food for a day or more during times of the year.
The UN says rising food insecurity is the result of fuel shortages, high prices, the effect of the coronavirus pandemic, and reduced international trade.
Access to aid and services
In 2014, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2165 (2014), which established four crossing points for UN agencies and humanitarian partners to deliver humanitarian aid, in addition to those already in use.
Closure of border crossings and reduced humanitarian access
Only one of the four crossings remains open: Bab al-Hawa border on the Turkey-Syrian border, near Idlib. This is one of the few areas still controlled by opposition forces to Assad.55 At the UN Security Council, Russia and China have blocked the renewal of the other three crossings.
Humanitarian access is constrained across Syria by continuing conflict:
• 46% of subdistricts are estimated to have mines and unexploded ordnance
• 41% experience military operations that impede humanitarian operations
• 31% see interface in humanitarian work. Of the 13.4 million in need of assistance, humanitarian agencies face moderate or high access restraints to reach 4.1 million of them (30%).
A total of 531 Syrian and international aid workers have been killed working in the country from September 2011 to July 2021.
Damage to infrastructure
Syrian infrastructure has also been severely damaged by the conflict. In 2017, the World Bank estimated that:
• 27% of Syrian's housing stock had been destroyed or damaged (based on a survey of ten cities)
• Half of medical facilities have been damaged, and 16% destroyed (based on a survey of eight governorates)
• 63% of educational facilities have been destroyed or damaged
• Power generation was 62% lower in 2015 compared to 2010.
Syria’s economic crisis
Since 2011, Syria has seen substantial economic disruption. The longer the conflict continues, the greater its long-term impacts on the country’s prospects are likely to be, and the higher the costs of reconstruction.
Rising poverty
• In 2021, the UN estimated 80-90% of the Syrian population lived in poverty.
• In 2017, using different measures, the World Bank estimated the proportion living in extreme poverty rose from 12% of the population in 2007 to 63% in 2016.
• The war is estimated to have also had negative impacts on Syria's neighbours, pushing up poverty rates by four percentage points in Jordan, six in Iraq and seven in Lebanon.
Collapse in GDP and economic activity
• Syria’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) shrank 45% between 2010 and 2019 (measured by official estimates), or by 78%, if the black-market rate is used.
• Export revenues collapsed from US$ 11.9 billion in 2010 to US$ 0.6 billion in 2019.
• Economic losses were estimated to total US$ 442 billion from 2012 to 2020, up from US$ 260 billion in 2016.
• Inflation is estimated to have been the equivalent of 800% from 2011 to 2019.
• Unemployment in 2015 was estimated to be 55%, rising to 75% among young people.
Weakened government revenues
• The think-tank, the Atlantic Council, estimates Syria's budget has fallen from US$ 753 per capita in 2010 to US $227 in 2021.
• Gross public debt is estimated by the IMF to have risen from 30% of GDP in 2010 to 150% in 2015.
• Total government revenues were 83% lower in 2021 compared to 2010.
In June 2021, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) said the total number of those killed from March 2011 to June 2021 could be as high as 606,000, including 495,000 documented by the organisation. The total includes civilians, rebel, government and terrorist fighters, and others.
The SOHR also estimated 2.1 million civilians have been injured or made permanently disabled because of the conflict. In 2016, the World Health Organization had said 1.5 million people had been injured since the crisis began.
Missing people
The exact number of Syrians who have forcibly disappeared, been detained, abducted, or gone missing is unknown.
In 2019, the UN said that reports suggested that more than 100,000 had gone missing since the start of the conflict, "largely, but not only, because of the Syrian government."
In 2021, a report to the UN said the whereabouts of "tens of thousands" of those detained remained unknown.
Impact on children
In addition to the estimated 27,126 children killed in the ten years from March 2011,36 according to UN figures:
• From 2011 to 2020 more than 5,700 children were recruited into the fighting.
• In March 2021, refugee children numbered 2.5 million.
• In March 2021, 3.5 million children were out of school, including 40% of girls. Enrolment prior to the conflict was 97%.
Refugees and displaced people
The total pre-war population of Syria was around 21 million. More than half this population is now displaced from their homes, either internally within Syria or as refugees abroad.
Internally displaced people (IDP)
As of December 2020, there were around 6.7 million internally displaced people living in Syria. 5.8 million have been displaced for more than three years. Only 11% of IDP households intended to return to their area of origin in 2021.
As of August 2020, the largest numbers of IDPs are found in opposition controlled Idlib (1.8 million) and regime-controlled Aleppo (1.2 million). The city of Damascus and rural Damascus governorates, held by the regime, had 1.9 million IDPs.
IDPs represent half of all people in humanitarian need in Syria.
Syrian refugees
Refugees first started leaving Syria in large numbers in 2012, with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees recording around 730,000 Syrian refugees in that year. This number grew rapidly to around 5.1 million refugees and asylum seekers in 2015 and has continued to grow in every year since.
In 2021, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) recorded 6.8 million Syrian refugees and asylum seekers globally.
Two thirds of Syrian refugees (4.5 million individuals) live in Turkey and Jordan, with most of those (54% or 3.7 million individuals) residing in Turkey. As of 2021, Jordan was hosting the third largest population of Syrian refugees (670,000), followed by Germany (620,000), and Iraq (250,000).
The UNHCR estimates that 70% of Syrian refugees live in poverty. This rises to 80% in Jordan prior to the Covid-19 pandemic (under the poverty line of US$ 3/day) and 89% of those in Lebanon (who live on less than half the Lebanese minimum wage).
Humanitarian needs of the population
The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports there were 13.4 million in need of humanitarian assistance in 2021.
This included 2.7 million people in Aleppo and 2.2 million in Idlib. 75% are women and children. 2.3 million of those aged over 12 have a disability.
In 2021, around 12.4 million were food insecure, meaning they are compromising on food quality or variety, or reducing the quantity they consume. This was a 56% rise from the 7.9 million food insecure people in 2019. This includes 1.3 million who are severely food insecure, meaning they had no food for a day or more during times of the year.
The UN says rising food insecurity is the result of fuel shortages, high prices, the effect of the coronavirus pandemic, and reduced international trade.
Access to aid and services
In 2014, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2165 (2014), which established four crossing points for UN agencies and humanitarian partners to deliver humanitarian aid, in addition to those already in use.
Closure of border crossings and reduced humanitarian access
Only one of the four crossings remains open: Bab al-Hawa border on the Turkey-Syrian border, near Idlib. This is one of the few areas still controlled by opposition forces to Assad.55 At the UN Security Council, Russia and China have blocked the renewal of the other three crossings.
Humanitarian access is constrained across Syria by continuing conflict:
• 46% of subdistricts are estimated to have mines and unexploded ordnance
• 41% experience military operations that impede humanitarian operations
• 31% see interface in humanitarian work. Of the 13.4 million in need of assistance, humanitarian agencies face moderate or high access restraints to reach 4.1 million of them (30%).
A total of 531 Syrian and international aid workers have been killed working in the country from September 2011 to July 2021.
Damage to infrastructure
Syrian infrastructure has also been severely damaged by the conflict. In 2017, the World Bank estimated that:
• 27% of Syrian's housing stock had been destroyed or damaged (based on a survey of ten cities)
• Half of medical facilities have been damaged, and 16% destroyed (based on a survey of eight governorates)
• 63% of educational facilities have been destroyed or damaged
• Power generation was 62% lower in 2015 compared to 2010.
Syria’s economic crisis
Since 2011, Syria has seen substantial economic disruption. The longer the conflict continues, the greater its long-term impacts on the country’s prospects are likely to be, and the higher the costs of reconstruction.
Rising poverty
• In 2021, the UN estimated 80-90% of the Syrian population lived in poverty.
• In 2017, using different measures, the World Bank estimated the proportion living in extreme poverty rose from 12% of the population in 2007 to 63% in 2016.
• The war is estimated to have also had negative impacts on Syria's neighbours, pushing up poverty rates by four percentage points in Jordan, six in Iraq and seven in Lebanon.
Collapse in GDP and economic activity
• Syria’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) shrank 45% between 2010 and 2019 (measured by official estimates), or by 78%, if the black-market rate is used.
• Export revenues collapsed from US$ 11.9 billion in 2010 to US$ 0.6 billion in 2019.
• Economic losses were estimated to total US$ 442 billion from 2012 to 2020, up from US$ 260 billion in 2016.
• Inflation is estimated to have been the equivalent of 800% from 2011 to 2019.
• Unemployment in 2015 was estimated to be 55%, rising to 75% among young people.
Weakened government revenues
• The think-tank, the Atlantic Council, estimates Syria's budget has fallen from US$ 753 per capita in 2010 to US $227 in 2021.
• Gross public debt is estimated by the IMF to have risen from 30% of GDP in 2010 to 150% in 2015.
• Total government revenues were 83% lower in 2021 compared to 2010.
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